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Prereorganization Negotiations and Securities
Act Section 5(c): A Proposed Solution to the
Gunjumping Problem
The author focuses on the apparent conflict between section 5(c) of
the Securities Act of 1933, which prohibits any "offer to sell" a secu-
rity before a registration statement is filed, and the need for prereorgani-
zation negotiations with shareholders of the corporation to be acquired.
Reviewing the possible exemptions from registration which might apply
to the reorganization transaction, he concludes that often no exemption
will be available and some form of registration will be required. The
author then evaluates the approach currently taken by the SEC to permit
these prereorganization negotiations. After demonstrating the numer-
ous difficulties caused by this approach, he proposes a new rule which
would avoid the problem of prereorganization guniumping and at the
same time eliminate the unnecessary burdens on the acquired-corpora-
tion negotiators which the SEC's present position imposes.
I. INTRODUCTION
C ORPORATE ACQUISITIONS and reorganizations have become a sig-
nificant means of distributing securities to individual investors.'
Although the investor protection afforded by the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act)2 is just as critical whether the recipient of
the security is a shareholder of an acquired corporation or a new
investor purchasing for cash,3 some aspects of these reorganization
transactions 4 do not fit smoothly into the framework of an act prin-
cipally structured to deal with conventional offerings.5 This Note
will consider the problems encountered under the Securities Act in
dealing with the negotiations leading up to a reorganization and
will analyze the tensions created by the method by which the Securi-
1 In 1968 one authority concluded, "In terms of the number of transactions and
the value of securities issued, acquisitions now rival, if they do not surpass, conventional
offerings as a format for the issuance of stock." Schneider, Acquisitions Under the Fed-
eral Securities Acts - A Program for Reform, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1323, 1340 (1968).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
3 See notes 17-19 infra and accompanying text.
4 The reorganization transactions dealt with in this Note include (1) mergers and
consolidations, (2) exchanges of securities for securities, and (3) exchanges of securities
for assets. Following the scheme for classifying tax-free reorganizations contained
in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(C), these transactions will be termed
A, B, and C reorganizations, respectively, though not all the reorganizations referred
to herein would necessarily meet the specific requirements of the Code for nonrecogni-
tion treatment.
5 See Schneider & Manko, Rule 145 - Part II, 6 REv. SEC. REG. 991, 995 (1973).
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ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) currently attempts to resolve
them.
Section 5 (c) of the Securities Act6 prohibits offers to sell or to
buy securities prior to the filing of a registration statement. When
a prefiling offer to sell is made - a practice termed "jumping the
gun" - the offeror is liable to those who purchase securities from
him for rescission or, if the purchaser no longer owns the security,
for damages. 8  Because of the broad definition given "offer to sell"
in section 2(3) of the Securities Act,9 the preliminary negotiations
between potential parties to a reorganization may be held to violate
section 5(c).
A good example of the opportunities for gunjumping in a reor-
ganization transaction is provided by Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v.
Bangor Punta Corp.," which involved a battle between Chris-Craft
and Bangor Punta for control of the Piper Aircraft Corporation.
In January 1969, Chris-Craft began to acquire Piper stock, first on
the open market and then through a series of tender offers. The
Piper family," seeking to thwart a takeover by Chris-Craft, began
negotiating with Bangor Punta. On May 8, 1969, these negotiations
resulted in an agreement, 12 and Bangor Punta issued a press release
announcing its intention to make a tender offer for the remaining
6 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or me-
dium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration state-
ment has been filed as to such security ....
7The basic policy reason for preventing offers prior to filing is to prevent any
possibility of psychological commitment on the part of offerees until there is structured
information on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See SEC v. Con-
tinental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1972).
8 Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. 771(1) (1970). To recover under section
12(1) the offeree must ultimately purchase the security. However, the SEC has injunc-
tive power that may be exercised even though there are no purchasers, Securities
Act § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970), and there are criminal penalties for illegal
offers without sales. Id. § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
) 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970). "Offer" includes "every attempt or offer to dispose"
of a security. Id. This language has been interpreted broadly. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 181, 512 n.163 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See generally
SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS - A REAPPRAISAL OP FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS - THE WHEAT REPORT 127-35 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WHEAT REPORT].
10 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
11 The Piper family owned 31 percent of the outstanding Piper stock.
12The Piper family agreed to exchange their Piper stock for specified Bangor
Punta securities; Bangor Punta agreed to make a tender offer to Piper shareholders
in an attempt to obtain more than 50 percent of the outstanding Piper stock. 426
F.2d at 571.
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Piper shares. The Second Circuit determined that the press release
constituted an offer to sell Bangor Punta shares and held that, since
no registration statement had been filed by Bangor Punta, this offer
violated section 5(c). 13
The facts involved in Bangor Punta suggest an earlier instance
of gunjumping, not considered by the Second Circuit, but more
relevant to the present discussion than the tender offer question.
Since an offer must have been made by Bangor Pinta to the Piper
family members during the negotiations which led to the agree-
ment, it is arguable that the gun was jumped prior to the issuance
of the press release. 4 All B reorganizations, like the transaction
involved in Bangor Punta, have always contained the seeds of such
gunjumping. And since the recent promulgation of SEC Rule 145,"5
3UId. at 576. This part of the case revolved around whether the press release
was exempted from the definition of "offer to sell" as a notice of a proposed offering
under SEC Rule 135, 24 Fed. Reg. 5117 (1959), as amended, 17 C.F.R. § 230.135
(1973). The court held that the categories of information allowed under the rule
are exclusive and that, because the press release assigned a value to the offered Bangor
Punta securities, it did not fall within the rule.
The litigation between Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta has been both protracted
and involved and may not yet be over. After the issuance of the May 8, 1969,
press release, the SEC sought a permanent injunction against violation of section 5(c)
by Bangor Punta and Piper, and with the parties' consent the injunction was granted.
SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., [1969-1970 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
92,428 (D.D.C. 1969). Chris-Craft then sued Bangor Punta and Piper, but the district
court held there had been no violation of the securities laws and dismissed a motion
for a preliminary injunction. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303
F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the denial
of the preliminary injunction, but holding that section 5(c) had been violated by
the issuance of the press release prior to registration, remanded the case. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970). On remand,
although the district court found violations by Bangor Punta and Piper of the secu-
rities laws, it denied all relief to Chris-Craft. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The district court also dismissed a counter-
claim brought by Bangor Punta. Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
337 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Meanwhile, the SEC had sued Bangor Punta
for a permanent injunction against further violations and an order requiring Bangor
Punta to offer Piper shareholders who had tendered their stock the right to rescind.
The district court granted the latter motion, but denied the former. SEC v. Bangor
Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). All three of these district court
decisions were appealed. (By this time, Chris-Craft had dropped its daim that Bangor
Punta had violated section 5(c) and was asserting violations of the antifraud provisions.)
The Second Circuit upheld the district court's decisions in the SEC and Bangor Punta
cases, but reversed the decision in Chris-Craft. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 231, 232 (1973).
14 Indeed, since the Piper family contracted to exchange their Piper stock with
Bangor Punta, see note 12 supra and accompanying text, a sale was consummated
during the negotiations in contravention of Securities Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
77e(a)(1) (1970).
:' 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973), adopted by SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316,
pt. II (Oct. 6, 1972).
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which provides that in certain instances A and C reorganizations
may involve "offers to sell," the potential for gunjumping during
negotiations now exists in A and C reorganizations as well.'
Applying section 5 to reorganizations means that offers inherent
in prereorganization negotiations must somehow be legitimized. As
this Note will describe, the method currently used by the SEC to
do so causes substantial problems. Nonetheless, valid reasons exist
for subjecting reorganization transactions to the section 5 disclosure
requirements. Although the exchange of securities in a reorganiza-
tion differs in many ways from an initial distribution (the situation
to which section 5 was primarily intended to apply) ,'1 the need
for the protection which structured disclosure affords the acquired
corporation's shareholders is much the same as the public's need
for such disclosure generally.' 8 Mere ownership of stock in a corpo-
ration about to be acquired, even if that ownership amounts to con-
trol, does not guarantee an ability to evaluate the stock of the ac-
quiring corporation.'l  Information is needed. And the fact that
negotiations are underway does not necessarily ensure that the target
corporation's negotiators will have access to the needed information
or the ability to extract it. It is important therefore that the acquir-
ing corporation be required to disclose relevant information about
itself both during the prereorganization negotiations and in the time
between negotiations and the actual issuance of the securities.
At the same time, there are compelling reasons for deferring
registration until the negotiation process has been completed. Clear-
ly, the plan of reorganization ordinarily cannot be carried out until
a final agreement on all the terms and conditions of the transaction
has been reached. 0 Also, most state corporation laws require that
for some types of reorganizations the board of directors must ap-
1 6 Prior to January 1, 1973, under SEC Rule 133(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(a)
(1973), rescinded, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, pt. I (Oct. 6, 1972), no
"sale," "offer," "offer to sell," or "offer for sale," occurred for the purpose of section
5 in an A or C reorganization if all the conditions of the rule were satisfied. Since
registration was not required in such reorganizations, the gun could not be jumped
during prereorganization negotiations. For a discussion and criticism of rule 133,
see 1 Loss 518-39 and WHEAT REPORT, supra note 9, at 251-96.
17 1 LOSS 183.
18 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316 (Oct. 6, 1972).
19 See Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 993.
20 While it is possible for an acquiring corporation to engineer a tender offer
(B reorganization) without consulting with the acquired (target) corporation, the prob-
lems encountered by Chris-Craft Industries demonstrate the pitfalls of failing to get
the target corporation's prior approval of the transaction. See notes 10-13 supra and
accompanying text.
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prove the transaction and then submit it for shareholder approval."
The resolution submitted to the shareholders has to include the
terms of the reorganization, which must be worked out in the prior
negotiations.
Moreover, as a matter of fairness and practical necessity, the
issuer (the acquiring corporation) should be permitted to complete
negotiations and to achieve finality of agreement before being re-
quired to file a registration statement. First, the registration state-
ment must contain information relative to the transaction, information
which can be obtained only after negotiations have been con-
cluded.22  Second, should the issuer want to circumvent the regis-
tration requirements entirely through the use of the section 3(a) (10)
exemption for securities issued pursuant to an order of a court or
governmental authority after a hearing on fairness,23 he must know
the terms of the transaction before he applies for the order.24 Third,
it may be necessary to establish the terms of the reorganization
if the issuer plans to seek an exemption from state blue sky laws.2
21 E.g., ALI-ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 71-73, 79 (1969 version) [hereinafter
citcd as MBCA]. Under MBCA § 73 the board of directors of each constituent
corporation in an A reorganization must approve the transaction, then submit a res lu-
tion for shareholder approval. No such requirement exists for a B reorganization,
although sometimes the board of the acquired corporation will voluntarily pose the
question before the shareholders. For a C reorganization MBCA § 79 requires approval
by the shareholders of the acquired corporation only.
2 2 See Securities Act schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970). The information
available only after finalization of the agreement includes that required by item (13)
(use of proceeds from securities), item (16) (offering price of securities), item (21)
(information concerning property to be acquired with proceeds from securities), and
item (27) (profit and loss statements for acquired business). Nonetheless, prospec-
tive acquiring corporations may periodically register securities "for the shelf," so that
registered securities are available when they find an attractive target corporation. See
Schneider, supra note 1, at 1338 n.50. Shelf registration is one obvious method of
avoiding the problem of negotiation gunjumping, but the last sentence of Securities
Act § 6 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1970), which states, "A registration statement shall
be deemed effective only as to the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered,"
has been interpreted by the SEC as prohibiting shelf registration. See 1 Loss 296-98.
But the portion of section 2(3) dealing with warrants and rights implies that shelf
registration was contemplated by the Act. See id. at 299-300.
23 Securities Act § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (10) (1970), quoted in note
40 infra.
24 See notes 47-48 infra and accompanying text
2 In states that have adopted provisions similar to UNIFORM SEcURIuTIES Acr §
401(j)(6)(C), which incorporates the rule 133 "no sale" theory, see note 16 supra,
into the definition of "sale" and "offer," A and C reorganizations are all exempt.
In states that have no such exemption, or where a B reorganization is involved, the-
need for blue sky registration may be eliminated by state provisions similar to Secu-
rities Act § 3(a) (10). See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 (Page 1964), dis-
cussed at note 44 infra. But see text accompanying note 24 supra. In states that have
neither of these exemptions, the issuer may have available an exemption for securities
that are listed or approved for listing upon notice of their issuance on enumerated
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Finally, in most cases the acquiring corporation will want some as-
surance of the viability of the proposed reorganization before under-
taking the large expense of registration.26
II. REORGANIZATIONS AND THE
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT
In view of the extremely broad definition given "offer to sell"
by section 2(3),2 there is little chance that an acquiring corpora-
tion can successfully conduct prereorganization negotiations with the
target corporation's managing shareholders without making a statu-
tory offer.28 If no exemption from registration applies to this trans-
action, the negotiations will constitute gunjumping unless a registra-
tion statement is filed before the negotiations begin.2" This section
will discuss the circumstances under which reorganizations require
registration and consider some of the exemptions that might be
available.
A. Treatment of Reorganizations Under the Securities Act
1. B Reorganizations0
In a B reorganization the acquiring corporation offers to exchange
its securities for target corporation securities. Regardless of whether
the acquiring corporation negotiates with target company manage-
ment, it ultimately makes the offers to buy and to sell directly to the
stock exchanges. See, e.g., UNIFORM SECURITES Acr § 402(a)(8); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1707.02(E)(1) (Page 1964). For the securities to qualify for exchange listing,
however, the terms of the transaction must be known. See, e.g., NEw YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, INC., COMPANY MANUAL at B-37 (1959).
26 But see note 21 supra.
27 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
28 It can perhaps be argued, however, that if the acquiring corporation plans
to issue new securities to carry out the exchange, that is, if the acquiring corporation
does not have sufficient authorized but unissued securities already on hand, it is not
in a position to offer and therefore cannot make an offer to sell these securities. Such
an argument would most likely fail, though, since the issuance of the new securities
is within the control of the acquiring corporation and will have been planned for
when the negotiations begin.
29 If no registration statement has been filed, the acquiring corporation's offer
to sell will violate section 5(c). See note 6 supra. In addition, if any of the acquired
corporation's management shareholders accept the offer, section 5(a)(1), which prohibits
the sale of securities before the registration statement becomes effective, will be violated
as well. See note 14 supra. Even if a binding contract is not formalized, if acquired-
corporation management control sufficient stock to satisfy shareholder approval require-
ments, see note 21 supra, their approval of the reorganization at the board level
may violate section 5 (a) (1).
30 See generally Bromberg, Exchange Offers, 2 REV. SEC. REG. 805, 807-08 (1969).
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target-company shareholders. As a result, there is a classic section
2 (3) "offer," and the acquiring corporation must register its securities.
2. A and C Reorganizations: Rule 145
Historically, A and C reorganizations were treated differently
from B reorganizations as a result of SEC Rule 133, which said that
no sale occurred in A and C reorganizations.3 Since the promulga-
tion of rule 145, which reverses the rule 133 "no sale" approach,
this dichotomy of treatment has ended. Basically, rule 145 provides
that an" 'offer,' 'offer to sell,' 'offer for sale,' or 'sale' shall be deemed
to be involved, within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act" in the
case of any reclassifications, mergers or consolidations, and transfers
of assets where "pursuant to statutory provisions ... or pursuant to
provisions contained in its certificate of incorporation or similar con-
trolling instruments, or otherwise" such transactions are "submitted
for the vote or consent of ... security holders."-" If a prospective
reorganization is covered by rule 145, some form of registration will
be requiredP 4
While means of avoiding the application of rule 145 exist, the
rule is sufficiently all inclusive to make any escape from the registra-
tion requirement for securities issued or exchanged in A or C reorga-
nizations difficult. Rule 145 does not apply where shareholder ap-
proval of the transaction is not provided, whether by way of general
corporate law, a charter provision or a gratuitous grant by the direc-
tors. But shareholder approval is usually a mandatory step in any
A or C reorganization. 35 The only express exception to the applica-
3 1 See note 16 supra.
32 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973). See generally Schneider & Manko, Rule 145, 5
REV. SEC REG. 811 (1972); Note, Business Combinations and Registration Require-
ments: SEC Rule 145, 47 N.Y.U.L REV. 929 (1972).
33 SEC Rule 145(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (a) (1973).
34 Registration of a rule 145 transaction may be on SEC Form S-14, which permits
the prospectus to be a proxy or information statement. Form S-14 may also be
used by rule 145(c) underwriters, see notes 149-56 infra and accompanying text,
when they resell their securities. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, pt. V.A,
(Oct. 6, 1972).
35 Most state corporation statutes will require shareholder votes in A and C reorgan-
izations. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 73, 79. Similarly, corporate charters may contain such
a requirement. As originally proposed, rule 145(a) would have applied only in these
two situations. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5246 (May 2, 1972). As finally
adopted, however, rule 145(a) added after the provisions for shareholder approval
by statute or charter the phrase "or otherwise," an addition which commentators have
argued should be interpreted broadly. Schneider & Manko, supra note 32, at 812
& n.12. Also, while the rule originally referred to shareholder "vote," the words
"or consent" were added to expand the shareholder approval condition. SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5316, pt. II. B (Oct. 6, 1972).
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tion of rule 145 to mergers and consolidations - where the sole pur-
pose of the reorganization is to change the issuer's domicile36 - is
inapplicable to a reorganization involving two or more going con-
cerns. And attempts to avoid the application of rule 145 to a sale of
assets by not distributing the acquiring corporation's securities to the
acquired corporation's shareholders within one year following share-
holder approval of the transaction will most likely be futile.37 Finally,
even if rule 145 is avoided, there may still be a section 2(3) offer to
sell and, therefore, a required registration.38
B. Exemptions from Registration
The preliminary note to rule 145 suggests one method of avoiding
the negotiation gunjumping problem: "Transactions for which statu-
tory exemptions under the Act, including those contained in Sections
36 SEC Rule 14 5(a)( 2 ), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(a)(2) (1973).
37 Rule 145 will apply to the distribution of the acquiring corporation's securities,
no matter how long the intervening time period, if it can be shown that the earlier
transfer of assets by the acquired corporation was "part of a preexisting plan for
distribution of such securities." Rule 145 (a) (3)(iv).
The theory underlying rule 145 is that in all forms of reorganizations, A and
C as well as B, the acquiring corporation is in essence making an offer to sell to
the individual shareholders of the acquired corporation. See SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5316, pr. I (Oct. 6, 1972). Applying this characterization to a C reorganization
presents a problem, however. While in a B reorganization the offer and exchange
of securities is made directly to the acquired corporation's shareholders, in both A
and C reorganizations there are really two steps. In an A reorganization the acquiring
corporation makes the offer, then, by operation of law, shares held in the acquired
corporation are exchanged for shares in the acquiring corporation at the same time
as the assets and liabilities of the acquired corporation are merged into the acquiring
corporation. In a C reorganization the first step is the exchange of acquiring-corpora-
tion securities for acquired-corporation assets; the second step is the distribution of
the acquiring-corporation securities by the acquired corporation to its shareholders,
usually during the dissolution of the acquired corporation. Here, the offer from the
acquiring corporation to the acquired-corporation shareholders takes place at the second
step, when the offered securities reach the acquired-corporation shareholders. It is
the nexus between these two steps that determines whether the transaction is within
rule 145. Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of rule 145(a)(3) apply the rule whenever
the plan or agreement approved by the shareholders, see note 35 supra, provides
for either the dissolution of the acquired corporation or the distribution of the acquiring
corporation's securities. Subparagraph (iii) caufes the rule to apply when the board
of directors, within. one year after the shareholder approval, adopts a resolution requir-
ing such dissolution or distribution. By adopting such a resolution more than one
year later, the board may be able to avoid rule 145. The "preexisting plan for
distribution" test of subparagraph (iv), a catchall provision which operates "notwith-
standing (i), (ii), or (iii), above," would then become the determinative test of whether
rule 145 applied.
3 8 See Schneider & Manko, supra note 32, at 814. The SEC noted in the release
accompanying rule 145, for example, that although short-form mergers are not within
the scope of the rule, such transactions are subject to the registration requirements
of section 5, since there is a section 2(3) offer and sale. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5316, pt. II.B.2 (Oct. 6, 1972).
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3(a) (9), 3(a) (10), 3(a) (11), and 4(2), are otherwise available
are not affected by Rule 145."" 9 If one of these exemptions from
registration is available for the reorganization, the negotiations can
be freely carried on.
1. Section 3(a)(10): Securities Issued in Reorganizations
Approved by a Court or Governmental Authority
'Where the proposed reorganization is supervised by a court or
governmental authority, the issuance of securities in the reorganiza-
tion is exempt under Securities Act section 3(a) (10).40 The legis-
lative history indicates that the basis for the exemption was the be-
lief that continuing judicial or administrative supervision would ful-
fill the need for the protection afforded by registration.41 In prac-
tice, however, this ongoing supervision has not been achieved.
Oneshot initial approval of the transaction, obtained through a hear-
ing on its fairness, is apparently all that is necessary to secure the
exemption. 42
The design of section 3 (a) (10) makes it possible for the acquir-
ing corporation to obtain a simultaneous exemption at the federal
and state fevels 43 by seeking a fairness order from the state blue
sky administrator.44 For the order to effect an exemption under
section 3(a) (10), several requirements must be met. First, "some
adequate form of notice" of the fairness hearing must be given to
39 Preliminary Note to SEC Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1973).
40 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970) exempts:
Any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstand-
ing securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and
partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and ex-
change are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and con-
ditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such
exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or
agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insur-
ance commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized by
law to grant such approval.
41 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933).
42 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 312 (Mar. 15, 1935).
43 Exemption from state blue sky laws is discussed at note 25 supra.
44 Given the probable increase in demand for state fairness orders as a result
of the SEC's adoption of rule 145, blue sky administrators may become less willing
to sanction this means of escaping federal registration. For example, the Ohio Division
of Securities has recently reevaluated its policy on granting fairness hearings under
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 (Page 1964), and enumerated several situations
in which no hearing will be granted. Among its reasons for doing so were "the
principles underlying Section 3(a)(10)" and "the widespread existence of [gunjumping]
in connection with reorganization transactions." OHIo SEcuRITIES BULL., June 1973,
at 4-5. The proposed Ohio Securities Act does not contain an equivalent to section
1707.04. S.B. 338, 110th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1973).
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all persons to whom securities will be issued.45  Second, the state
agency must have express legal authorization to approve the fairness
of the terms and conditions of the issuance and exchange of the
securities.4 6 Third, and most important, the hearing procedure
must be completed and final approval obtained before any offers
may be made.4 7
This necessity of securing final blue sky approval before the
exemption may be had does not completely preclude the acquiring
corporation from conducting preliminary negotiations with its target
before it initiates the fairness hearing. First, it may always deal
with nonshareholder management. Second, some leeway to estab-
lish at least the outlines of a reorganization plan is implicit in the
"notice" required by the SEC as a condition for the exemption.48
Finally, Professor Loss has suggested that the acquiring corporation
may be able to negotiate directly with shareholders in the target
corporation, even to the point of obtaining tentative commitments,
if state law so requires as a prerequisite for commencing the fairness
hearing. 49 But even if the Commission were willing to accept this
suggestion,"° it is of little use in the numerous states which grant
a fairness hearing irrespective of preliminary shareholder approv-
al.5  Other than these exempted communications, section 5(c) will
45 SEC Securities Act Release No. 312, § 1 (Mai. 15, 1935). Apparently the
SEC, as a practical matter, does not view this notice as constituting an "offer to sell,"
although such a communication to shareholders seems to meet the attempt-to-dispose
test of section 2 (3).
46 Id. § 2. See Institutional Corp. of America, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,133 (SEC 1971). For an example of such an express
authorization, see OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04(A) (Page 1964).
47 1 Loss 587-88; see SEC Securities Act Release No. 3000 (June 7, 1944). The
section 3(a)(10) exemption will not operate retroactively to shield offers made before
the fairness order is issued from the prohibitions of section 5(c). See generally 1
Loss 587-91.
48 See note 45 supra. Left open by the Commission is the question of the precise
boundaries on this opportunity for the issuer to make these preexemption communica-
tions to offeree shareholders.
49 1 Loss 588. Professor Loss reasons that unless the communications necessary
to secure these state-required indications of approval from offeree shareholders were
exempted, "the operation of §3(a)(10) would be stymied." Id.
50The SEC has demonstrated a willingness to temper its rules to accommodate
state law. See, e.g., SEC Rule 135(a)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(a)(6) (1973) (per-
mitting notices of proposed offerings to include any statement required by state law).
It is questionable, though, whether the Commission would accept something so at
odds with its overall regulatory policies as an agreement for the sale of securities
before a registration statement has been filed or an exemption sought. It has recently
stated that if a final agreement is reached before the blue sky administrator passes
on the issue, the section 3(a)(10) exemption is rendered unavailable. Fidelity Financial
Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,840 (SEC 1972).
5 1 E.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 (Page 1964).
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prohibit any attempt to work out the terms of a preliminary reorga-
nization plan before obtaining the fairness order. And without
some solid framework outlining the proposed transaction, the state
fairness hearing is unlikely to be available, since there are no real
terms for the blue sky administrator to approve the fairness of. As
a result, the conditions for obtaining the section 3 (a) (10) exemption
place the issuer in much the same gunjumping predicament as the
registration requirement does.12 Furthermore, there is another aspect
of the section 3 (a) (10) exemption that undercuts its usefulness in
avoiding gunjumping. Although section 3 of the Securities Act ex-
pressly exempts securities, some of its subsections, including subsec-
tion (a) (10), are transaction exemptions.53 Therefore, absent later
registration or an applicable exemption, securities issued in a section
3(a) (10) exempt reorganization cannot be resold by their recipi-
ents.5
2. Section 4(2): Non-Public Offerings
Section 4(2) 55 of the Securities Act exempts "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering." Professor Loss has
noted that "[t]hese few words support a substantial gloss."56  In
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,57 the principal decision on section 4(2),
the Supreme Court stated that the private offering exemption should
be interpreted
in light of the statutory purpose. Since exempt transactions are
those as to which "there is no practical need for [the bill's] ap-
plication," the applicability of [section 4(2)] should turn on
whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection
of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to
fend for themselves is a transaction "not involving any public of-
fering."58
52 See notes 21, 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
5 1 Loss 708-10; SEC Securities Act Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936). See Se-
quential Information Sys., Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
5 79,139 (SEC 1972).
54 For a discussion of resale restrictions, see notes 128-37 infra and accompanying
text.
55 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467,
§ 12, 78 Star. 580, in amending Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4, 48 Stat. 77,
redesignated the second clause of former paragraph (1) as paragraph (2). Accordingly,
pre-1964 sources cited herein will refer to section 4(1) as the section exempting
nonpublic offerings.
56 1 Loss 653.
57 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
58 Id. at 125.
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In other words, an offering is private if the offerees have possession
of or access to information regarding the issuer which would other-
wise be made available through registration.5" The number of of-
ferees is an important factor in determining whether the offering
is public or private.6" But relevant as well are the number of
units offered and the manner of the offering." Also, the exemption
has been interpreted to require that the offerees take the offered
securities for investment and not for resale.62
In an attempt to clear up the confusion surrounding the applica-
bility of the section 4(2) exemption, the SEC has proposed rule
146,6" which will provide a nonexclusive "safe harbor"6 " under
section 4(2) for offerings that satisfy all of its five conditions. First,
offers may be made only to those who the issuer, prior to making
59 Id. at 127; Gilligan Will & Co., 38 S.E.C. 388 (1958), afl'd, 267 F.2d 461
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
The SEC has warned that "[t]he exemption does not become available simply
because offerees are voluntarily furnished information about the issuer. Such a construc-
tion would give each issuer the choice of registering or making its own voluntary
disclosures without regard to the standards and sanctions of the Act." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). Accord, 4 LOSS 2632 (Supp. 1969). See Hill
York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688 (5th Cir. 1971).
But see Schneider, supra note 1, at 1335 n.42. But where securities are offered and
sold to a few sophisticated and experienced institutional investors, the section 4(2)
exemption can be satisfied by supplying the investors with information. In such
cases, the institutional investors are deemed to have both access to the information,
by virtue of their bargaining position, and the ability to extract, analyze, and use
it. See Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 5 91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
60 1 Loss 654. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123-25 (1953).
There is no minimum number of offerees below which the exemption presumptively
applies. Id.; see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
688 (5th Cir. 1971); SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935); 1 LOSS
660-64; 4 id. at 2644-46 (Supp. 1969). But see Schneider, supra note 1, at 1335
n.42. Furthermore, the SEC and the courts have gone beyond the mere number
of offerees, and in a sense have combined the number and offeree knowledge factors
by considering the relationship of the offerees to one another and to the issuer. E.g.,
SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cit. 1972); SEC Securities
Act Release No. 285, § 1 (Jan. 24, 1935).
61 SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972); SEC
Securities Act Release No. 285, §§ 2-4 (Jan. 24, 1935).
62 SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 159 (5th Cir. 1972). See
generally 1 Loss 665-87. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) sum-
marizes this requirement: "An important factor to be considered is whether the secu-
rities offered have come to rest in the hands of the initial informed group or whether
the purchasers are merely conduits for a wider distribution."
3 Proposed SEC Rule 146, 38 Fed. Reg. 28956 (1973), proposed in SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973).
64 "Transactions by an issuer which do not satisfy all of the conditions of this
rule shall not raise any presumption that the exemption provided by Section 4(2)
of the Act is not available for such transactions." Preliminary Note to Proposed
SEC Rule 146, 38 Fed. Reg. 28956 (1973).
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any offer, has reasonable grounds to believe are persons who possess
"such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
that they are capable of evaluating the risks of the prospective in-
vestment ....,65 If the issuer does not have reasonable grounds
to believe the offeree possesses these qualifications, then (1) the of-
feree must utilize the services of an "offeree representative,"66 and
(2) the issuer must have reasonable grounds to believe - once
again, before any offer is made - that (a) the offeree representa-
tive has the capacity to evaluate the investment,0 7 and (b) the of-
eree is "able to bear the economic risk of the investment."'6 Second,
offers may not be made by any form of general advertising, 9 and, at
some time prior to the sale, there must be "direct communication"
with each offeree or his representative.7" Third, the issuer must
make available to the offeree or his representative prior to the sale
(1) the same kind of information that is required by Securities Act
65 Proposed SEC Rule 146(d)(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973). This requirement
reflects the Court's statement in the Ralston Purina case, text accompanying note 58
supra, that for section 4(2) to apply the offerees must be able to fend for themselves.
See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973).
66 The requirements for qualifying as an "offeree representative" are specified in
subparagraph (a)(1) of the p-oposed rule.
67 Proposed SEC Rule 146(d)(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973).
6 8 Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973). The present version
of subparagraph (d)(2) contains two changes from the original version. As originally
proposed, the rule required that the offeree be able to bear the economic risks in
all cases. Proposed SEC Rule 146(d)(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26140 (1972). By limiting
this requirement in the revised version, the Commission has apparently decided that
in the instances where an offeree representative is not required, and the offeree there-
fore possesses the requisite financial expertise on his own, it will not second-guess
his appraisal of his capacity to bear the risk. Second, the revised proposals do not
apply the requirement to offerees in business combinations.
The proposed rule sets forth no standards for gauging when the offeree is "able
to bear the economic risk." Commentators had suggested that the phrase might require
that the security be suitable for the particular investor and his investment objectives.
Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 992. But it now appears that the Commission
intends a test less stringent than total "suitability." It has implied that the requirement
will be satisfied if the investor has sufficient liquid assets that he can afford to hold
unregistered securities for an indefinite time and sufficient overall resources that he
can absorb a complete loss. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973).
69Proposed SEC Rule 146(c)(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973). The proposed
rule prohibits any form of broadcast or newspaper advertising. It permits advertising
by other written communication or by promotional meeting only if all of the recipients
or persons who attend meet the requirements of paragraph (d), discussed at notes
65-68 supra and accompanying text.
7Proposed SEC Rule 146(c)(2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973). Subparagraph
(a)(2) of the proposed rule defines "direct communication" to mean an opportunity
for the offeree or his representative to ask questions and receive answers concerning
the transaction from the issuer. This provision is substituted for the requirement
in the earlier rule that the securities could be offered and sold only in a "negotiated
transaction" between each purchaser and the issuer. Proposed SEC Rule 14 6 (a)(3),
(c) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26140 (1972).
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schedule A and (2) the opportunity to obtain any additional infor-
mation necessary to verify the accuracy of the required information,
to the extent such information is possessed by the issuer or reason-
ably obtainable.7' Fourth, during any consecutive 12-month period,
there must not be more than 35 persons who purchase from the
issuer securities exempted from registration by section 4(2) or rule
146.72 Finally, the issuer must take steps to ensure that the securi-
ties issued in the transaction will not later be distributed to the
public. 3
71 Proposed SEC Rules 146 (e)(1)-(2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973). Subparagraphs
(e)(1)(i) and (e)(1)(ii) and the accompanying note provide that, if the offeree enjoys
an employee relationship or economic bargaining power with respect to the issuer
that enables him to obtain the information, providing access to the information is
sufficient; otherwise, the offeree must be furnished the information.
The requirements contained in paragraph (e), along with those contained in para-
graph (d), see notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text, appear to be an extension
of the "access plus ability to utilize" standard, discussed at note 59 supra, which
was previously available primarily in offerings to institutional investors. Rule 146
does not expressly provide an exemption for offerings where the offerees have specific
naturally acquired knowledge of the issuer, but such an opportunity for exemption
survives by virtue of the prerule precedents under section 4(2) which the rule preserves.
See note 64 supra.
Proposed rule 146 also requires that the issuer inform each purchaser in writing
prior to a sale that:
a purchaser of the securities must continue to bear the economic risk of the
investment for an indefinite period because the securities have not been reg-
istered under the Act and therefore are subject to the restrictions set forth in
paragraph (h) hereof [discussed in note 73 inifra] and cannot be sold unless
they are subsequently registered under the Act or an exemption from such
registration is available.
Proposed SEC Rule 14 6(e)(3), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973).
72Proposed SEC Rule 146(g)(2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973). Purchasers of
not less than $150,000 of securities for cash are excluded from the count, but not from
the requirements of the rule. Proposed SEC Rule 14 6 (g) (3) (ii) (a), 38 Fed. Reg.
28959 (1973). While rule 146 places limits on the number of purchasers, under
section 4 (2) precedent the number of offerees had been the principal concern. 1 Loss
655.
73 Proposed SEC Rule 146(h), 38 Fed. Reg. 28959 (1973). These steps include
(1) a reasonable inquiry to determine whether the purchaser is an "underwriter,"
(2) use of restrictive legends on the certificates, (3) issuing stop-transfer instructions,
and (4) obtaining "investment letters" from the purchasers.
The "reasonable inquiry" standard provides needed protection for the issuer in
a private offering. Under existing law, no matter how cautious the issuer is in securing
assurances that the purchasers are acquiring the securities with the intent to hold
for investment purposes required under section 4(2), see note 62 supra, it is always
possible that the exemption may subsequently be lost. One purchaser could decide
to resell his securities shortly after issuance and consequently create a strong inference
that the investment intent required of him was lacking at the time of purchase. See
Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962). By conditioning the exemption
on a reasonable inquiry, rule 146 seems to permit the issuer to unlink the certainty
of the exemption from the subsequent conduct of the purchaser, though such a result
is at odds with the Commission's longstanding position that the issuer is at its peril
to police the activities of private purchasers.
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The problems encountered in applying section 4(2) and rule
146 to reorganizations can be illustrated by the following hypotheti
cal situation, which will be used throughout the subsequent analysis.
Assume that Y Corporation is interested in acquiring X Corporation.
Y is a large publicly held corporation with securities registered under
section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) .74 X has one class of voting stock, 60 percent of which is
owned by the members of one family, as follows:
SHAREHOLDER PERCENT OWNED
A 26




The remaining X stock is owned by 100 unrelated shareholders.
X management consists of:
NAME POSITION
A President, Chairman of
the Board
C Vice President, Director
D Director
F Secretary-Treasurer
(owns 1% of the
voting stock of X)
Y has approached X management concerning its interest in the ac-
quisition. C has expressed some doubts about the family giving
up control-of X. E also has some doubts and as a result desires
to be present during further discussions between the corporations.
B has no interest in the conduct of the business and will not partici-
pate in the negotiations. He will go along with whatever his son,
A, decides.
Without the benefit of proposed rule 146, it is doubtful that
the issuer, Y, can obtain a private-offering exemption. Under prerule
section 4(2) analysis, while the number of offerees was not conclu-
sive, it was highly significant.75 That X corporation has 105 share-
holder-offerees might alone be sufficient to prevent the exemption.
The additional factor that not all of these shareholders stand in
a position with respect to the issuer that will guarantee their access
to relevant financial information 76 places the exemption beyond
7415 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
75 See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
76 See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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reach. Unlike the issuer in a private offering for cash, Y Corporation
cannot .select and restrict membership in the offeree class. It is
bound by the characteristics of X's shareholders at the time of the
offer.77
Y Corporation cannot seek to secure an exemption by confining
its negotiations to the few dominant X sh'areholders who might
qualify as permissible offerees for the private-offering exemption. The
SEC has stated: "[Section 4(2)] does not exempt every transaction
which is not itself a public offering, but only transactions 'not involv-
ing any public offering.' Accordingly, . .. the exemption is not
available to securities privately offered if any other securities com-
prised within the same issue are made the subject of a public offer-
ing.' 7 8  The Y securities offered and sold to X Corporation's princi-
pal shareholders, who will participate in the negotiations, and those
later offered and sold to all other X Corporation shareholders consti-
tute a single issue,79 and together preclude the possibility of a sec-
tion 4(2) exemption. 80
Under the present law, it appears that the private offering ex-
emption will rarely be available in a reorganization transaction, ex-
cept, perhaps where the acquired corporation is closely held.81 If,
77 Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 991. The fact that reorganizations pose
special problems for issuers in the application of section 4 (2) was recognized by
the WHEAT REPORT, supra note 9, at 293-94. It recommended the adoption of rule
181, which would have provided that offers and sales of securities "made solely in
connection with the acquisition by the issuer of a bona fide going business to not
more than 25 offerees" would be deemed to be transactions "not involving any public
offering." Id. app. VI-1, at 27. The SEC proposed the rule for adoption, Proposed
SEC Rule 181, 34 Fed. Reg. 17181 (1969), but it was never adopted.
78 SEC Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939) (emphasis added). See
1 Loss 687-89.
79 For a discussion of what constitutes a single "issue," see Unity Gold Corp.,
3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938), and SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973).
80 SEC Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1973), provides that section 4(2) shall
apply "to transactions not involving any public offering at the time of said transactions
although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering .. " (Empha-
sis added). The emphasized phrase makes the rule inapplicable to the hypothetical,
where the offering to X shareholders was contemplated from the beginning.
81 One commentator states that experienced practitioners consider the exemption
applicable in reorganizations where the acquired corporation has about 25 or fewer
shareholders. Schneider, supra note 1, at 1335 n.42; cf. Schneider & Manko, supra
note 5, at 994. But even in these close corporations, there is no assurance that every
shareholder will possess the naturally acquired information or the capacity to extract
and evaluate the information as required by the exemption. In a recent no-action
letter, General Alloys Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
78,134 (SEC 1971), the SEC allowed nonregistered securities to be issued under
a section 4(2) exemption in a B reorganization where the acquired corporation had
35 shareholders, consisting of four substantial shareholder-directors who negotiated
the transaction for the acquired corporation, one additional principal shareholder, 21
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however, the SEC adopts proposed rule 146, the exemption will
become available in numerous reorganizations where publicly held
corporations are being acquired. In the hypothetical situation, be-
cause the rule permits the use of an offeree representative, it is no
longer necessary that each and every X shareholder qualify as a
proper offeree. To facilitate representation of offerees in "business
combinations," 2 the rule takes a rather bold step and excepts from
the definition of "offer" communications sent to shareholders by an
executive officer, director, or affiliate of an acquired corporation for
the purpose of soliciting their consent to his acting as their represen-
tative.8 3  By employing this procedure in the hypothetical, A could
partners or retired partners in a major accounting firm or close members of their
families or trusts established by them, three personal acquaintances of those partners,
a vice president of the acquired corporation, and five former employees of the acquired
corporation or their transferees. The no-action letter does not explain the rationale
behind the SEC position. But in light of the wide diversity of acquired-corporation
shareholders, it is questionable whether they all had the requisite relationship with
their own corporation, let alone with the issuer. Perhaps, in view of the representation
of the offerees by the negotiating shareholders, cf. Proposed SEC Rule 146(a) (1),
38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973), discussed in note 66 supra, and the fact that after the
transaction the acquired corporation's shareholders would own almost two-thirds of
the acquiring corporation, the SEC believed that the need for Securities Act protection
was minimal.
8 2 Business combination is defined to include "a reclassification, merger, consolida-
tion, transfer of assets, exchange of securities or other similar business reorganization."
Proposed SEC Rule 146(f)(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973).
83Proposed SEC Rule 146(f)(3), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973). Given the strong
policy reasons for extending the structured disclosure requirements to reorganizations,
see notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text, rule 146 might go too far in its attempt
to raze some of the special hurdles faced by acquiring corporations seeking to obtain
private-offering exemptions. The only information that must be supplied in the solicita-
don are summary items such as:
(a) the name of the issuer of the securities to be offered and the names
of other parties to the transaction;
(b) a brief description of the business of the parties to such transaction,
and the anticipated time of the offering;
(c) a brief description of the transaction to be acted upon and the basis
upon which such transaction will be made ....
Proposed SEC Rule 146 (f)(3)(ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973). The officer, director,
or affiliate who undertakes to act for target corporation shareholders needs to possess
only the general qualifications required of all offeree representatives and must disclose
to the offerees any existing or contemplated relationship between himself and the
issuer, any compensation he is to receive from the issuer, and the terms of his transac-
tion with the issuer if they are not identical to those available to shareholders generally.
Proposed SEC Rules 146(a) (1), (f) (2), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973). Since, under
subparagraph (e)(1) of the rule, the structured selling information can be made avail-
aBle to the offeree or his representative, there is no guarantee that the information
which would have been required by registration will ever filter down to the individual
shareholder. To the extent that the rationale for the section 4(2) exemption is that
the offerees already possess (or possess the means to possess) all the information that
would be disclosed by the registration process, see SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 125-27 (1953), proposed rule 146 falls short of its proper mark. On
the other hand, the proposed rule may signal an admission by the SEC that information
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obtain authorizations to serve as offeree representative for each of
the 100 unrelated X shareholders. If any of the X shareholders
whom A solicits decides that they would prefer someone other than
A to represent them, the rule provides that each shareholder may
select his own offeree representative and may receive from the ac-
quiring or acquired corporation the reasonable expenses of hiring
him.84  As long as Y Corporation has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve, prior to making any overtures, that A, or any other offeree
representatives selected in his stead, and the X shareholders like
E, who choose to represent themselves, all possess the necessary busi-
ness expertise, and Y makes available to them the information re-
quired by paragraph (e), the transaction may be eligible for section
4(2) treatment. 5 The only obstacle is the number of X share-
holders who will ultimately receive Y stock. An issuer who engages
in no other section 4(2) transactions in a given year can make a
reorganization offering to at least 70 unrelated persons.86 Unless
exclusions can be found for the additional 35 X shareholders,87 the
reorganization in the hypothetical will be deemed a public offering.
Notwithstanding the results for Y Corporation, proposed rule
in the hands of qualified surrogates, whether pursuant to section 4(2) or in a fully
registered offering, is enough to satisfy the Securities Act's disclosure-to-investors require-
ments.
84Proposed SEC Rule 146(f)(2)(ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973).
85 But see notes 92-93 infra and accompanying text. The "private" nature of the
offering will be destroyed, though, if one or more X shareholders refuse to accept
offeree representation, and Y has no reasonable grounds to believe they can qualify on
their own. But given the provisions for reimbursing the expenses of obtaining inde-
pendent representation, see text accompanying note 84 supra, the probability of these
maverick shareholders ultimately deciding to go it alone seems slight. Nonetheless
this prospect illustrates the rather curious operation of proposed rule 146. The ac-
quired-corporation shareholder with some business sophistication is helpless, he cannot
demand registration and must be content to receive information about the issuer which
may be substantially inferior to that which registration would disclose. (For example,
some issuers are permitted to use unaudited financial statements in discharging the
information requirements if no audited statements are available. Proposed SEC Rule
146(e) (1) (ii) (b), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973).) The unsophisticated shareholder,
on the other hand, is in effect given a blackball over the exemption, which he can
exercise by deciding not to use an offeree representative. But that blackball loses its
power if the shareholder does anything that would cause the issuer to believe that he
has business acumen.
86The basic limitation of proposed rule 146 is 35 purchasers, see note 72 supra,
but in the case of business combinations, up to 35 acquired-corporation shareholders
are excluded from the count. Proposed SEC Rule 146(g)(3)(ii)(f), 38 Fed. Reg.
28959 (1973).
87 Exclusions which might be applicable in the case of X Corporation include
those for any shareholder who is a spouse or close family member of another X share-
holder, for any trust in which a shareholder or his family members own all the
beneficial interest, and for any officer or director of the issuer, Y. Proposed SEC
Rules 146(g)(1)(i)(a), (b), (3)(ii)(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 28958 (1973).
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146 will provide a concrete means for issuers seeking to acquire
small public corporations to escape the gunjumping problem. The
rule is not without its difficulties, however, perhaps the greatest of
which concerns the offeree representative concept. To be an of-
feree representative a person must, inter alia, have "such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable
of evaluating the risks of the prospective investment .... .. Per-
haps a group of professional offeree representatives will be estab-
lished, but it appears that the Commission is to some extent relying
on the dominant shareholders in the acquired corporation to perform
this representative role. 9 Even if some of these shareholders are
willing to assume this agency obligation while negotiating with the
issuer,90 in many cases there will be no one within the acquired
corporation who is qualified to act as offeree representative for other
shareholders.9
As the proposed rule is presently drafted, the problem of offeree
representation is aggravated because, unlike the standard imposed
upon the issuer for assessing the offeree's expertise, reasonable
grounds to believe that the representative qualifies are not suffi-
cientY2 By definition, a person cannot qualify as an offeree repre-
sentative unless he does in fact possess the necessary business acu-
men. If the offeree's representative does not actually have such
8 8 Proposed SEC Rule 146(a)(1)(ii), 38 Fed. Reg. 28957 (1973).
n Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 993.
90 For a discussion of the reasons why majority shareholders may be unwilling
to accept this agency relationship, see id.
91id.
9 2 Even under the "reasonable grounds" test placing the burden upon the issuer
creates some problems. The rule provides that the issuer must have reasonable
grounds to believe that the nature of the offerees satisfies the rule 146(d) requirements
"prior to making an offer" (emphasis added). The rule does not explain how the
issuer can have reasonable grounds for an opinion on prospective offerees without
"attempting to dispo.e" of its securities. Cf. Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at
993; SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935). The process of acquiring
"reasonable grounds" would probably entail "attempting to dispose" of securities unless
the issuer has no duty to investigate and can rely on a lack of unfavorable knowledge.
However, it is arguable that such a duty was intended. First, the language of the
rule, "ft]he issuer .. .shall have reasonable grounds to believe" (emphasis added),
seems to indicate that the issuer has an affirmative duty. This language should be
contrasted with the reference in subparagraph (h)(1) of the rule to "making reasonable
inquiry" and the phrasing used in the section 11 due diligence defenses, Securities
Act §§ 11(b)(3)(A)-(D), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b)(3)(A)-(D) (1970), which either ex-
pressly provide for "reasonable investigation," or imply that no affirmative duty is
imposed through the phrase, "no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe."
See 3 Loss 1727. Second, if the issuer could satisfy rule 146(d) by doing nothing
so long as it had no unfavorable knowledge about a prospective offeree, the policy
underlying proposed rule 146 and section 4(2) precedent would not be served; the
issuer would be safest where it knew nothing about the offerees.
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knowledge and experience, the rule 146 exemption will be lost even
if the issuer has reasonable grounds to believe that he does qual-
ifyY3
Thus, it appears that neither section 4(2) nor proposed rule 146
can solve all the problems of negotiation gunjumping. And even
if the private-offering exemption is successfully used, the securities
issued in the transaction will be subject to resale restrictions.9 4
3. Other Exemptions
Although most of the other Securities Act exemptions are clearly
inapplicable to A, B, and C reorganizations, two deserve some com-
ment. The intrastate exemption, Securities Act section 3(a) (11),"
while available, will rarely be applicable to reorganizations. The
acquiring corporation must take the acquired-corporation sharehold-
ers as it finds them and it will not often happen that all of the
acquired corporation shareholders will be domiciliaries96 of the state
where the acquiring corporation is incorporated and doing busi-
ness. 1 The integration concept will prohibit any attempt to treat
9 3 The language of proposed rule 146(d) ("The issuer . . . shall have reasonable
grounds to believe .. . (1) that either the offeree or his offeree representative has,
or both together have, [the necessary experience in business and financial matters]")
implies that a reasonable belief in the representative's qualifications is sufficient. But the
definitional criteria for "offeree representative," set forth in proposed rule 146 (a) (1),
contain no reasonable belief standards. Thus, when the offeree's agent does not in
fact possess the requisite knowledge and experience, the conditions in paragraph (d)
will not be satisfied no matter how reasonable the issuer's belief is concerning the
agent's qualifications, for the issuer's belief must relate to one who already qualifies
as an "offeree representative." Although this result may not have been intended by
the SEC, the language of the rule seems to require it. And should the issuer make
an offer to an unqualified agent, a not unlikely possibility since issuers apparently
may make offers after they have the required "reasonable grounds to believe," this
offer (along with any other offers which the issuer may have previously made) will
violate section 5 (c), since proposed rule 146 will be inapplicable.
94 See notes 128-37 infra and accompanying text.
95 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970) exempts:
Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons res-
ident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is
a person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated
by and doing business within, such State or Territory.
96 See 1 Loss 598.
97The requirements of section 3(a)(11) are most likely to be met when the
acquired corporation is closely held. If this section is available in such a situation,
it, rather than section 4(2), may be used, and some of the problems inherent in
the private-offering exemption can be circumvented. The SEC has recently proposed
rule 147, which defines the terms and clarifies the conditions of section 3(a)(11),
but will not affect the requirement that offerees be domiciliaries of the state where
the issuer is resident and doing business. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5349 (Jan.
8, 1973).
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sales to affiliates as a separate "issue" in applying section 3 (a) (11) .9
The integration concept is not applied, however, to regulation
A, the small-offering exemption,99 promulgated by the SEC pur-
suant to section 3(b) of the Securities Act. °'0  This exemption
applies when the aggregate offering price does not exceed
$500,000 °1 and apparently can be used to avoid negotiation gun-
jumping whenever the securities to be offered and sold to acquired-
corporation affiliates do not exceed this amount. However, regula-
tion A involves an abbreviated registration process 02 and restricts
offers prior to SEC clearance. 0 3  Accordingly, regulation A does
not present a totally realistic alternative, even if the price of the
offered securities is within its limit.104
III. IF REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED
Do THE NEGOTIATIONS VIOLATE SECTION 5 (c) ?
A. The SEC's Solution - Underwriter Status and Section 2(3)
To alleviate the problems of prereorganization gunjumping, the
SEC apparently treats the acquired-corporation shareholders who ne-
gotiate the deal as underwriters. Because section 2(3) excludes
from the definitions of "sale," "offer to sell," and "offer to buy"
preliminary negotiations or agreements between issuer and under-
writer, 05 the prereorganization discussions will not violate section
08 1 Loss 591-95; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961). See note
79 supra.
9 SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1973). There is no integration
when the balance of an offering begun under regulation A is later registered. 1
Loss 616.
100 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
10 1 SEC Rule 254(a) (1) (i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1) (i) (1973).
'
0 2 See SEC Rules 255-56, 17 C.F.R. § 230.255-.256 (1973). The regulation
A procedure is less expensive and time consuming than full registration. For example,
the financial statements submitted pursuant to regulation A need not be certified.
103 SEC Rule 255(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (a) (1973); 1 Loss 625-26.
104 The major advantage offered by regulation A is that, since a full registration
statement is not required, there is no section 11 liability for either the issuer, or
perhaps more importantly here, for acquired-corporation affiliates. Section 11 is dis-
cussed at notes 123-27 infra and accompanying text.
105 Securities Act § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970):
The [terms] "sale" or "sell" . . . "offer to sell," "offer for sale," or "offer" ...
and the term "offer to buy" as used in subsection (c) of section 5 shall not
include preliminary negotiations or agreements between an issuer (or any per-
son directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by an issuer, or under di-
rect or indirect common control with an issuer) and any underwriter or
among underwriters who are or are to be in privity of contract with an issuer
(or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by an issuer, or
under direct or indirect common control with an issuer).
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5 (c). Although the SEC has never officially announced this position,
Professor Loss has stated:
In the case of a share-for-share exchange between Corporations A
and B when those in control of the corporation sought to be ac-
quired (B) are cooperative, the SEC considers that they are "un-
derwriters" on the theory that they are "selling for" the acquiring
corporation, thus permitting discussions with the management un-
der the "preliminary negotiations" clause of §2(3) before an of-
fer is made to the shareholders generally. 10 6
The SEC's approach does not solve the prereorganization gun-
jumping problems satisfactorily. Whether the liability and denial
of investor protection accruing to underwriters under the Act are
consistent with the role of the acquired-corporation negotiators in
the reorganization is discussed in the second part of this section.
But two threshold problems must be considered beforehand.
First, stretching the Act's definition of underwriter to encompass
shareholders who negotiate for the acquired corporation is no simple
task. By virtue of section 2 (11) an underwriter is:
[a]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to,
or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participa-
tion in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation
in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking;
but such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited
to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the
1064 Loss 2562 (Supp. 1969) (citations omitted). Accord, Bromberg, supra note
30, at 812. Although Professor Loss mentions only B reorganizations, a recent no-
action letter, American Hospital Supply Corp. (SEC June 4, 1973), suggests that
the Commission's approach will be extended to A and C reorganizations as well now
that rule 145 has become effective. In that letter the Commission stated that the
execution of an agreement establishing, subject to shareholder approval, the rights
of the parties in a C reorganization did not constitute a "sale" where affiliates of the
corporation to be acquired joined in the execution of the agreement. But it added
that any solicitation of an affiliate's proxy or his promise to vote his shares in a
specific manner would be a sale or offer to sell and subject to section 5. That the
Commission premised its decision on a view that the acquired-corporation affiliates
are underwriters is indicated by its statement that section 2(3) excludes "preliminary
negotiations between an issuer and an underwriter" and its subsequent reasoning that
execution of the agreement was not a sale because it was "preliminary" to the submis-
sion of the agreement for shareholder approval. In using the word "preliminary"
the Commission must have meant something more than occurring earlier in time,
since clearly the transactions with the affiliates represent "attempts to dispose" and
would violate 5(c) no matter when they occurred, so long as no registration statement
has been filed. By "preliminary" then the Commission must have meant something
else; it must have intended the word as a shorthand for its conclusion that the af-
filiates fell within the preliminary-negotiations-with-underwriters exception to section
2(3). This result makes the Commission's later statement that the solicitation of
proxies from the affiliates would violate section 5 rather puzzling. If the affiliates
are to be considered underwriters, then even a firm contract to exchange their shares
for those of the issuer would not be treated as a section 2(3) "sale." See 2 Loss 213.
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usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used
in this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an
issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by
the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control
with the issuer.10 7
As described by Professor Loss, the SEC's tack is to apply the
"underwriter" label to those "in control"'0 8 of the corporation to
be acquired - in other words, the "affiliates" of that corporation 0 9
- for purposes of section 2(3). But the statutory definition of
an underwriter in section 2(11) says nothing about affiliate status;
one becomes an underwriter only by engaging in the specified affirm-
ative activity - purchasing from an issuer with a view to, or selling
for an issuer in connection with, a distribution, or participating in
such a transaction. Mere status is insignificant, especially status
within a corporation other than the issuing corporation. The SEC
overcomes this conceptual hurdle by indulging in what amounts to a
conclusive presumption that acquired-corporation affiliates who are
"cooperative" in the early reorganization negotiations will end up
"selling for" the acquiring corporation if an agreement is reached.
Affiliate status is critical to the presumption because the Commission
apparently assumes it will be those in control of the acquired corpo-
ration who will promote the sale of acquiring-corporation securities
to their fellow shareholders. It is certainly questionable whether
the likelihood that controlling shareholders of the acquired corpora-
tion will ultimately "sell for" the acquiring corporation warrants
viewing them as underwriters of the entire issue at the time negotia-
tions begin, and, as a result, denying them the treatment accorded
ordinary investors without any reference to their possible intent to
hold for investment the securities they actually receive in the re-
organization.""
107 Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970).
0 8 The Securities Act does not define "control," but the SEC has done so by
rule. 'rhe term 'control' (including the terms 'controlling,' 'controlled by' and 'under
common control with') means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through
the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." SEC Rule 405(f),
17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1973).
109 "Affiliate" is defined by the SEC as any person who directly or indirectly "con-
trols, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified."
SEC Rule 405(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (a) (1973). When used in this Note, unless
otherwise noted, "affiliate" means only a person who controls - the first part of the
SEC's definition.
110 When an ordinary investor purchases securities from an issuer, there is a
"sale" and the issuer is subject to the prohibitions of section 5. The purchase half
of the purchase-sale transaction and, when the investor resells the securities, the sale
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The second flaw in the SEC's approach is that the underwriter
exception will not always cover all of the negotiators. Consequent-
ly, the Commission's solution does not save all prereorganization
negotiations from gunjumping problems, and it does not provide
the acquiring corporation with a reliable means of determining
when it is risking a Securities Act violation. Some examples drawn
half of the resale transaction are usually exempt under Securities Act § 4(1), 15
U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970), which exempts "transactions by any person other than an
issuer, underwriter or dealer." See 1 Loss 182-84, 641-44. However, if the investor
has purchased "with a view to distribution" he will be an underwriter; the section
4(1) exemption will be unavailable, and, because section 2(3) excepts contracts between
the issuer and an underwriter from the definition of "sale," see id. at 213, the issuer
will not be governed by section 5. A thorough discussion of the "distribution" concept,
crucial to the ordinary investor-underwriter distinction, is beyond the scope of this
Note. Briefly, a distribution basically requires a "public offering," see id. at 551,
and the question of when a distribution has ended is answered, at least in part,
by whether the securities have come to rest in reasonably small quantities in the
hands of ordinary investors.
The problem with the Commission's approach is that insofar as it uses the "selling
for" branch of the underwriter definition to secure a section 2(3) exception for acquired-
corporation affiliates, these shareholders are deprived of ordinary-investor treatment in
all cases. It is entirely possible that although the affiliates of the acquired corporation
do in fact sell for the acquiring corporation by encouraging other acquired-corporation
shareholders to approve the transaction, they will intend to hold the securities they
receive in the transaction for investment, that is, they will not purchase "with a
view to distribution." But because they are considered "selling for" underwriters as
to the entire issue, their intent as to the securities they actually receive will be irrelevant.
It should be noted, however, that in stating the SEC approach to negotiation
gunjumping, Professor Loss is less than clear on this problem. After setting forth
the "selling for" basis for applying the section 2(3) exception, see text accompanying
note 106 supra, he continues:
[This means that when there is a registration statement, either because B
[the acquired corporation) is publicly held or because some of the large B
stockholders take A [acquiring corporation] stock for distribution, there is a
problem of specifying those stockholders as underwriters in the registration
statement. This is easy enough when they are going to resell right away.
Otherwise the Commission is apt to ask for an undertaking to file a post-effec-
tive amendment or a new registration statement before any distribution that
would make them underwriters - though they might always demonstrate
that they had held the shares long enough so that they had lost an under-
writer's status.
4 Loss 2562 (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added). It is not logical that a "selling for"
underwriter can lose that status by holding the securities for any length of time.
Perhaps this inconsistency can be reconciled, however, if the large B stockholders
who take for distribution in Professor Loss's example are not affiliates of B and therefore
do not fall within the "selling for" branch of the section 2(11) definition of "under-
writer." But see note 112 infra.
Under the "selling for" branch of section 2 (11), an affiliate can, of course, lose
underwriter status by no longer being in a position where the SEC can view him as
presumptively acting on behalf of the issuer. In other words, the underwriter taint
"wears off" simply by his no longer being a "seller for" the issuer. Thus, after the
reorganization is consumated the affiliate can claim that his "selling for" activities have
ceased, and, absent any arguments that he is an underwriter under the "purchase form"
branch of section 2 (11), he can claim total immunity from underwriter status. This
result would allow him to sell his own securities freely.
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from the hypothetical discussed earlier will demonstrate the various
problem areas.
The nonaffiliate negotiator. - The SEC's position is to extend
underwriter status only to those in control of the acquired corpora-
tion. Since "control" under the Securities Act is an imprecise con-
cept,'11 however, the acquiring corporation may inadvertently jump
the gun by negotiating with a person who turns out not to be an
affiliate of the acquired corporation and who consequently will not
be deemed an underwriter for purposes of the section 2(3) excep-
tion. Avoidance of gunjumping by excluding nonaffiliates from the
negotiations requires an understanding by the acquiring corporation
of the determinants of control, a correct assessment of the status
of the individuals involved, and a willingness on the part of these
individuals to be excluded at the acquiring corporation's request.
Affiliate status depends on the entire situation within the corpora-
tion. Single factors such as shareholdings" 2 and management po-
sitions,"' while important, are not determinative."14
Ultimately the test is briefly stated: taking into account history,
family, business affiliations, shareholdings, position and all other
circumstances, what person or what group calls the day-to-day
shots? The shots in major matters? What person or what group
could, if it wished, call the shots? When these are identified the
controlling persons and the controlling group are identified. 115
In the hypothetical, Y Corporation's biggest worry regarding af-
filiate status involves E." 6  Since E owns only 3 percent of X's
"'I See Pennaluna & Co. v. SEC, 410 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cit. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1007 (1970). See generally 2 Loss 764-83; Sommer, Who's "In Control"?
- S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAW. 559 (1966).
112 Majority stock ownership is not required for an individual to be a controlling
person. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933); Thompson Ross Sec.
Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111, 1119 (1940). Indeed, much less may suffice. It has been noted
that ownership of 10 percent of a corporation's shares may raise a rebuttable presump-
tion of control, especially if the shareholder has other attributes of control as well.
Sommer, supra note 111, at 568. Cf. Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 997.
113 Although merely being an officer or a director does not make one a controlling
person, it raises a presumption to this effect Sommer, supra note 111, at 576-77;
see 2 Loss 781.
114 Sommer, supra note 111, at 563. See American-Standard, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 79,071 (SEC 1972).
115 Sommer, supra note 111, at 582.
116 There are other problems as well. Although B's 15-percent ownership may
be sufficient to make him an affiliate, see note 112 supra, he may not be, because
he takes no part in the conduct of the business of X Corporation. See Hexagon
Laboratories, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,497
(SEC 1971). But see Sommer, supra note 111, at 564. Of course, as A's father
and a member of the family that controls 60 percent of X and fills most of its
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shares and is not part of X's management, the only way in which
he might be deemed a controlling person is through his membership
in a controlling group by virtue of his family ties,117 and it is
not clear whether that alone is enough. It would probably be suf-
ficient if the family needs E to exercise control and E votes with
the group. But family membership will mean little if E is inactive
or usually out of step with a family that controls the corporation
without his vote."' Thus E's status as an affiliate probably depends
most of all upon the relationships among the various family mem-
bers "'19 - matters which are difficult for Y Corporation to assess
when it initiates the discussions. Since E wants to be present at the
negotiations to voice his doubts about the proposed reorganization,
Y is in a perilous position. If the negotiations are held with E
present, and if E dislikes the outcome, he can allege and possibly
prove that the gun was jumped as to himself since he is not an affili-
ate of X and therefore cannot be included as an underwriter under
the SEC approach.
The noncooperative affiliate negotiator. - In addition to being
affiliates, the acquired corporation's negotiators must be "coopera-
tive" in order for the section 2(3) exception to apply. C and E
present a problem in this respect since they are troubled by the fam-
ily giving up control of X. There is no way Y can ensure that they
will not oppose the transaction, even if Y is aware of their doubts.Y2
management positions, he may be a controlling person by virtue of being a member
of the controlling group. See notes 117-19 infra and accompanying text.
Since D is both a 5-percent owner and a director, as well as a family member,
there is little possibility of his not being an affiliate. See Sommer, supra note 111,
at 569. F's only attribute of control is his management position, which may not
alone make him an affiliate, but since he is an employee, he may be an affiliate in
the sense that he is "controlled by" X. See Schneider & Manko, supra note 35,
at 817 & n.42. Butsee note 118 infra.
117 See 2 Loss 779-80 & n.37.
118Sommer, supra note 111, at 580. If by virtue of A's "calling the day-to-
day shots" he is deemed to be in control of X, either alone or together with his
father, B, then there may be no controlling group, and no one else could be a controlling
person. See id. at 575. On the other hand, if the family is considered the controlling
group, perhaps nonfamily members like F would not be controlling persons. See id.
at 582.
119 See SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
afl'd sub nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959); Strathmore Sec.,
Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8207 (Dec. 13, 1967). However,
the ultimate issue is whether acquired corporation shareholders are "selling for" the
acquiring corporation. Merely being a member of a control group should not be
sufficient control to show that the member was "selling for" the acquiring corporation
though it might indicate control for other purposes, such as determining when a
sale is a secondary distribution subject to registration.
120 If Y enters the negotiations blind, not knowing X management's feelings
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If C and E oppose the transaction, they cannot be deemed to
be underwriters on the theory that they are "selling for" Y, for they
are certainly not promoting the reorganization to the public share-
holders of X. Furthermore, it may be argued that affiliates of X
who oppose the reorganization cease to be affiliates by breaking away
from the control group, and thus preclude the application of the
section 2(3) exception for this reason as well.121
The passive affiliate. - Since the use of the section 2 (3) excep-
tion is based on the theory that cooperative affiliates of X are under-
writers because they sell for Y, another problem is presented by
persons such as B, who are not uncooperative but play no active
role in the negotiations. The question is what amount of affirmative
conduct, if any, is required at the negotiations stage to trigger the
"selling for" presumption? Clearly those affiliates who encourage
the negotiations and advocate the proposed reorganization are "co-
operative." But what of affiliates who merely allow the negotiations
to continue without objection? These questions cannot readily be
answered. The only alleviation is that if the affiliate is entirely pas-
sive and the acquiring corporation does not need his approval, 12
the problem is mooted; the acquiring corporation can ignore him,
and the gun will not be jumped as to him.
In summary, although prereorganization negotiations do not per
se jump the gun under the analysis presently applied by the SEC,
acquiring corporations must currently overcome several potential
problems - some of which may be virtually insurmountable -
to bring all of the prospective acquired corporation's negotiators un-
der the aegis of the section 2(3) exception.
B. Effects of Underwriter Status
1. Section 11 Liability
By being termed underwriters rather than ordinary investors, X
Corporation's cooperative affiliates will be subjected to various addi-
tional burdens and liabilities under the Securities Act, not the least
of which is civil liability under section 11 for deficiencies in the
about the proposed transaction, it takes a chance that there will be opposition and
that it will jump the gun. Attempts by Y to feel out the X negotiators prior to
the negotiations, however, might be deemed to be "attempts to dispose" and present
the same gunjumping problem.
121 Cf. Schneider & Manko, supra note 32, at 817-18.
122 Chances are, however, that the acquiring corporation will not be able to ignore
an affiliate, because it may need either his management vote or, if the affiliate is a
substantial shareholder, an indication of his interest in the reorganization.
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registration statement.'23 Although section 11 gives underwriters
several defenses,' it contains no privity requirement and therefore
creates a great number of potential plaintiffs to whom underwriters
may be liable. 25
To hold acquired-corporation affiliates liable for omissions and
misrepresentations contained in a registration statement prepared by
the acquiring corporation is somewhat extraordinary. 20 Since such
liability is one of the results of underwriter status, any evaluation
of the SEC approach to solving the negotiation gunjumping problem
must include an analysis of the merits of imposing such liability
on acquired-corporation affiliates.' 27
2. Resale Restrictions
Underwriters may not freely resell unregistered securities they
have purchased. 12  They must have the original issuer register
the securities, 129 try to find another applicable exemption, or at-
tempt to qualify their sales under SEC Rule 144.130 Rule 144
sets forth conditions under which the sale of securities will not be
deemed to be a distribution and the sellers, therefore, not underwrit-
ers. First, there must be "available adequate current public infor-
mation with respect to the issuer of the securities."'' Second,
if the securities are "restricted,"' 32 they must have been held for
at least two years prior to the sale.'33 Third, the amount of secu-
123 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
124 1d. §§ 77k(b)-(c).
1253 Loss 1731.
126 To avoid this liability the parties to the transaction can draft indemnification
agreements. See Schneider & Manko, supra note 32 at 826. But see Globus v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970); Note to SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1973). See generally Bishop,
New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Liability
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1161-66.
127 See notes 165-70 infra and accompanying text.
128 Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970). See note 110 supra.
129 This registration can be brought about by obtaining registration convenants
from the issuer. See Schneider & Manko, supra note 32, at 821 & n.59. Such
convenants are specifically enforceable. Middlemark v. Nytronics, Inc., [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 93,372 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
130 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1973).
131 SEC Rule 144(c). For an interpretation of this requirement, see SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5306 (Sept. 26, 1972).
132 "Restricted securities" are securities acquired "in a transaction or chain of trans-
actions not involving any public offering." SEC Rule 144 (a) (3).
133 SEC Rule 144(d). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306, pr. VII (Sept.
26, 1972).
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ritiles sold must fall within the limits of the rule.' Finally the
sales must be made in "brokers' transactions."'1 5
Even if these requirements are met, however, rule 144 may not
apply, since it is only available to affiliates of the issuer and sellers
of restricted securities.13  Therefore, in a public offering, persons
such as the acquired corporation's affiliates in the hypothetical who
are deemed to be underwriters for purposes of the section 2(3) ex-
ception, but who are not affiliates of the issuer will be unable to
"leak" the securities they receive under rule 144.137
3. Underwriters and Securities Act Protection
Since the purpose of the Securities Act is to protect the pub-
lic,' 38 some courts have stated in dictum that underwriters, as par-
ticipants in the distribution process, are not entitled to the Act's
protection. 30 Whether or not such dicta are correct, the use of
the section 2(3) exception creates a situation where acquired-corpo-
ration affiliates may find it difficult to sue the acquiring corpora-
tion.140
'34 SEC Rule 144(e). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306, pt. VIII (Sept.
26, 1972).
135 SEC Rules 144(f)-(g). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306, pt. IX
(Sept. 26, 1972). The SEC must also be given notice of sales pursuant to rule
144. SEC Rules 144(h)-(i).
130 SEC Rule 144(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b) (1973):
Any affiliate or other person who sells restricted securities of an issuer for his
own account, or any person who sells restricted or any other securities for the
account of an affiliate of the issuer of such securities shall be deemed not to
be engaged in a distribution of such securities and therefore not to be an un-
derwriter thereof within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act if all the
conditions of this rule are met.
137 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306, pt. II (Sept. 26, 1972).
138S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
139 In Athas v. Day, 186 F. Supp. 385 (D. Colo. 1960), after holding that the
plaintiff's suit was barred by the statute of limitations, the court noted that the plaintiff
was an underwriter "and as such is not entitled to the protection of the Act ....
The Act does not 'protect those who are engaged in steps necessary to the distribution
of securities issues.' " Id. at 389. Similarly, in Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65 (5th
Cir. 1966), after holding that the original plaintiffs' suit was not a class action which
tolled the statute of limitations for plaintiffs added later, the court continued:
There is another reason why, in our opinion, the added claimants cannot re-
cover . ... [The original] action could be maintained by the original plain-
tiffs as a class suit only if they were members of the class they sought to rep-
resent. The cause of action under the Securities Act is given to those pur-
chasers who are not underwriters or dealers. [The original plaintiffs] being
underwriters or dealers are not members of the class entitled to recover and
hence they cannot maintain a class action.
Id. at 70.
14 0 See 3 Loss 1723 n.129.
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Securities Act section 12 expressly provides for recovery for vio-
lations of section 5141 and for misrepresentations made in offering
or selling securities.142  The implied private right of action under
SEC Rule lob-514 3 similarly provides a remedy for fraud "in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security."' 44  Finally, sec-
tion 11 provides relief for injury from omissions or misrepresenta-
tions in registration statements.145  All of these remedial provisions
require that the plaintiff be a "purchaser.' '1 46  If the section 2(3)
exception applies, however, by definition there is neither an offer
nor a sale, and presumably without a sale, there could be no pur-
chase.147  Thus, in order for the affiliates of the acquired corpora-
tion to assert any Securities Act cause of action against the acquiring
corporation, it will be necessary to resort to a troublesome "purchase
without a sale" fiction. 48
In summary, as a result of being deemed underwriters, acquired-
corporation affiliates (1) will be subject to section 11 liability for
141 Securities Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
142 Id. § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
143 See Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
144 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973), promulgated pursuant to Exchange Act § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The implied private right under Securities Act section
17(a) is substantially the same as that under rule lob-5, except that it applies to
defrauded purchasers only. For a discussion of the similarities between rule lob-
5 and section 17(a), see Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement
in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 363, 371 n.41
(1973).
145 See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text.
146 Section 12 provides that anyone who violates its provisions "shall be liable
to the person purchasing such security from him .... " The words "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security" in rule 10b-5 have been interpreted as
requiring that the plaintiff be a purchaser or a seller. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). And although
section 11 has broadened the class of potential plaintiffs by not requiring privity,
it still limits recovery to "any person acquiring such security," which in effect requires
that one be a purchaser. See 3 Loss 1731.
147 The Securities Act does not define "purchase." It "presumably is complemen-
tary to the word [sale]." 1 Loss 548. But see Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc.,
293 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), there the court held on the one hand that the
issuance of the defendant-acquiring corporation's stock was exempt under rule 133,
which exempted certain reorganizations as not involving a sale. Id. at 168. But
on the other hand, it denied a motion, based on the ground that the plaintiffs were
not purchasers, to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under sections 12(2) and 17(a) and
rule lob-5. Id. at 169-70. It should be noted, however, that the rule 133 "no
sale" provision applied only to section 5, so there could have been a sale in a rule
133 transaction for the purpose of applying the antifraud provisions.
1 4 8 See 1 Loss 533. Even if there has been no Securities Act "sale," there may
still have been a sale for Exchange Act purposes, since the Exchange Act definition
of sale, § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970), does not contain any exceptions.
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deficiencies in registration statements prepared by the acquiring cor-
poration, (2) may be unable to resell freely the securities they- re-
ceive in the reorganization, and (3) even if the protections of the
Securities Act are available despite their underwriter status, will have
to assert successfully the existence of a purchase without a sale in
order to succeed in a suit against the acquiring corporation. In order
to fully assess the impact of the use of the section 2(3) exception
to allow prereorganization negotiations and the resultant disabilities
placed upon acquired-corporation affiliates, however, it is necessary
to analyze the effect of postreorganization events on those affiliates.
C. Postreorganization Events and Underwriter Status
1. A and C Reorganizations: Rule 145(c)
Rule 145, which provides that a reorganization requiring share-
holder approval involves a Securities Act section 2(3) offer, defines
"underwriter" as follows:
[A]ny party to any [reorganization specified in the rulel, other
than the issuer, or any person who is an affiliate of such party at
the time any such transaction is submitted for vote or consent, who
publicly offers or setis securities of the issuer acquired in connection
with any such transaction, shall be deemed to be engaged in a dis-
tribution and therefore to be an underwriter thereof within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.149
This provision clearly applies to affiliates of the acquired corpora-
tion.' It applies to them the "purchased from with a view to
distribution" branch of the section 2 (11) underwriter definition, and
it does so with a vengeance. While an ordinary purchaser can es-
cape inclusion under this branch of section 2(11) by showing an
intent to hold the securities for investment,15' rule 145 (c) affords
no such defense. 52 It requires only that a person (1) be an
affiliate and (2) offer or sell the securities obtained in the rule 145
transaction to the public.'53 Thus unlike the section 2(11) under-
writer who can refute underwriter status by holding his securities,
149 SEC Rule 14 5(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.14 5(c) (1973).
150 Schneider & Manko, supra note 32, at 817 n.4 0.
151 See note 110 supra and accompanying text. This and other defenses to under-
writer status were available under rule 133(c), which defined underwriter in the same
terms as section 2(11).
152 See Note, Business Combinations and Registration Requirements: SEC Rule
145,47 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 929, 957 (1972).
153 It can perhaps be argued that the investment intent defense is implicit in
the second rule 145(c) requirement. But see notes 154-55 infra and accompanying
text.
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long enough to demonstrate an investment intent,154 an acquired-
corporation affiliate remains a potential rule 145 (c) underwriter for
as long as he owns the stock' 55 and becomes an actual underwriter
automatically once he sells his shares to the public. Further, since
rule 145(c) is not the exclusive means of obtaining underwriter
status,'5G an acquired-corporation affiliate who does not resell to the
public, and is therefore not a rule 145 (c) underwriter, may neverthe-
less be a section 2(11) underwriter if he did not have the requisite
investment intent when he received his securities or if he gets caught
in the "selling for" underwriter net, either because he actually solicits
on behalf of the issuer or because he is deemed to have done so
under the SEC's fiction discussed above.
Rule 145 (c), therefore, undercuts many of the arguments against
the use of the section 2(3) exception. Since affiliates of the acquired
corporation will be deemed underwriters under rule 145 (c) once
they offer their shares to the public, it is not entirely unpalatable
to deem them underwriters during the prereorganization stage in
order to apply the section 2(3) exception.' 57  And the SEC's pre-
sumptive use of the section 2(3) exception, because it is based on
the "selling for" branch of section 2(11) which negates the invest-
ment-intent defense to underwriter status,"'8 is also less objectionable
than it might be without rule 145 (c), since this defense is equally
unavailable under the rule. 59
There is an important difference, however, between being
deemed an underwriter for section 2(3) purposes and being
deemed one pursuant to rule 145 (c). Under rule 145 (c), under-
writer status will attach to an acquired-corporation affiliate at a much
later date, and perhaps may never attach at all. 60 This distinc-
tion may affect the existence of resale restrictions.' 6 ' However, for
154 See 1 Loss 551-52, 665-73.
155 Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 998-99; Note, supra note 152, at 957.
156 Schneider & Manko, supra note 32, at 818.
157 Section 2 (11) underwriter status will still be burdensome to acquired-corpora-
tion affiliates who do not resell the securities they receive in the reorganization, since
under rule 145 (c) they would not be underwriters.
15 8 See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
159 This is not to say, however, that the lack of defenses is any more justifiable
under rule 145 (c) than under the use of the section 2 (3) exception.
160 Under the SEC approach, in order for section 2(3) to except all prereorganiza-
tion negotiations, acquired-corporation affiliates must be underwriters at the time negotia-
tions begin. Rule 145(c), on the other hand, does not make the affiliate an underwriter
until he sells to the public the shares he received in the reorganization, a transaction
which, if it occurs at all, will occur after the reorganization has been consummated.
161 See note 110 supra, especially the fourth paragraph thereof, and notes 182 and
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purposes of section 11 liability, while it will have an impact on
when an affiliate becomes subject to suit,"6 2 the difference will not
alter the substance of the liability. No matter when underwriter
status attaches, the affiliate will be deemed to be an underwriter with
respect to the securities exchanged in the reorganization at the time
the registration statement was filed6 3 and will therefore be liable
for any omissions or misrepresentations it contains. But the differ-
ence in theories of underwriter status will have a significant effect
upon the investor protection which affiliates receive under the secu-
rities acts. Because rule 145 (c) does not make affiliates under-
writers until they decide to sell their shares, they may retain their
antifraud and section 12(1) remedies as long as they deem neces-
sary.1 64
While being treated as a rule 145(c) underwriter may not be
as onerous as being treated as one pursuant to the SEC's section
2(3) approach, there remain substantial problems with the rule's
183 infra and accompanying text. There is some justification for burdening acquired-
corporation affiliates with restrictions on the resale of the securities they receive in the
reorganization, since any prereorganization sale by these affiliates of their shares in the
acquired corporation would probably have been a secondary distribution requiring reg-
istration. As controlling persons they would be deemed "issuers" for purposes of section
2 (11), and their broker or dealer would be a section 2 (11) underwriter because he
"sells for" or "purchases from" an "issuer." See 1 Loss 700-06. Since restrictions
would attend the sale of their acquired-corporation shares, it is not unfair to extend
these restrictions to a sale of the acquiring-corporation shares they received in ex-
change. In both situations rule 144 will be available. See notes 171-72 infra and ac-
companying text.
162 By holding the securities they receive for a sufficient period, acquired-corporation
affiliates may be able to shield themselves from suit until the statute of limitations
has run. If the reorganization exchange represents a bona fide offering to the public,
any section 11 action not commenced within three years will be barred. Securities
Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
163 In setting forth its reasons for adopting rule 14 5(c), the SEC stated: "(F]rom
a practical standpoint, because [acquired-corporation affiliates) usually are in a position
to verify the accuracy of information set forth in the registration statement, and usually
are in a position to influence the transaction, the Commission believes that this provision
is not unreasonably burdensome." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5316, pt. 11.D
(Oct. 6, 1972). This indicates the Commission's belief that, once deemed an under-
writer, an affiliate will be treated as if he were an underwriter at the time the registration
statement was filed.
164 Once the affiliates become underwriters, their dealings with the acquiring corpo-
ration will no longer be deemed to be "offers" or "sales." As a result, relief under
sections 11, 12(1), and 12(2) of the Securities Act and rule lOb-5 may become
unavailable. See notes 138-48 supra and accompanying text. Foregoing relief under
section 12(1) is in the interest of both corporations, since it allows negotiations for
the reorganization. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text. But during the
prereorganization period, the affiliates have a compelling need for antifraud protection.
Yet since both section 12 (1) and the antifraud provisions require a purchaser it would
be difficult conceptually to reconcile denying affiliates the former remedy while providing
them the latter.
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scheme of calling an underwriter every acquired-corporation affiliate
who resells his securities to the public.
a. Section 11 Liability.- Being an underwriter subjects affili-
ates of the acquired corporation to section 11 liability, including
liability for statements prepared by the acquiring corporation in a
reorganization.'65 The SEC has asserted that because acquired-cor-
poration affiliates are typically in a position to verify these statements,
this liability should not prove "unreasonably burdensome."'166 Not
all commentators have agreed, however. 167  Being affiliates of the
acquired corporation in reality may give little, if any, ability to deter-
mine the truth of registration statements concerning the acquiring
corporation,'68 or to influence the content of the statements.'69
Accordingly, it is questionable whether affiliates of the acquired cor-
poration should be included among the persons who must investi-
gate and make certain that the registration statement is accurate.
Therefore, the imposition of section 11 liability, even in light of
the available defenses and the possibility of indemnification, seems
overly harsh. 7 0
b. Resale Restrictions: Rule 145(d).- Rule 145(d) "7' per-
mits persons who would otherwise be rule 145(c) underwriters to
"leak" the securities acquired in the rule 145 transaction in accord-
ance with rule 144.172 Although from the underwriter's point of
view this is not a totally acceptable solution since he would prefer
to be able to resell freely, it is probably better in most cases than
16 5 See notes 123-27 supra and accompanying text.
16See note 163 supra. Rule 145(c) as originally proposed based underwriter
status on the amount of securities received in the rule 145 transaction in relation
to the total outstanding amount of acquiring-corporation securities of the same class.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5246 (May 2, 1972). However, this test, which
would have helped to assure that the acquired-corporation shareholder was in a position
to influence the transaction, was abandoned after adverse public comments. SEC Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5316, pt. ILB.2 (Oct. 6, 1972).
167 See Note, supra note 152, at 954-61.
16 8 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
10 See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
170 Of course there is nothing wrong with holding acquired-corporation affiliates
accountable for statements concerning and originating from the acquired corporation.
The corollary is that it seems unfair to hold the acquiring corporation liable for
violations based on these statements. See Schneider & Manko, supra note 32, at
824-25.
171 SEC Rule 145(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.145(d) (1973).
172 Such persons would not be able to use rule 144 absent this express authori-
zation. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text. Rule 145(d) only requires
that rules 144(c), (e)-(g) be followed, that is, the rule 144(d) holding period be
inapplicable.
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having to register the securities before they are resold.173  In the
reorganization context, however, rule 144 presents some important
problems.
First, the rule 144 procedure may not be used unless "adequate
current public information with respect to" the acquiring corporation
is available. 7 4  If the acquiring corporation is a reporting company
under the Exchange Act 75 and its filings are up, to date, there
will be no problem; 76 otherwise there may be.' 77
Second, the provisions of rule 144 which require aggregating
securities in determining the amount of securities that may be sold
pursuant to the rule pose a further problem. Aggregation may be
required in two ways: 178 (1) rule 144(a) (2) has the effect of aggre-
gating sales of securities by an individual and certain related individ-
uals and entities by deeming them to be one "person" for the pur-
pose of the rule;17 and (2) rule 144(e)(3)(vi) expressly aggre-
gates sales by persons who "agree to act in concert for the purpose
of selling securities of an issuer." Therefore, affiliates of the ac-
quired corporation must be careful to avoid acting in concert, if it is
possible to do so. 80
Furthermore, by conclusively treating every acquired-corporation
affiliate, regardless of the amount of acquiring-corporation securities
he receives or resells, as an underwriter, rule 145 (c) produces prac-
tical problems not present under the use of the section 2(3) excep-
tion.' 81 No matter how small an amount of acquiring-corporation
173 This statement assumes, of course, that an exemption from registration is not
available and that the underwriter has no need to sell more than the relatively small
amount permitted by rule 144.
174 SEC Rule 144(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.14 4(c) (1973).
175See Exchange Act §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1970).
176 SEC Rule 144(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)(1) (1973).
177 SEC Rule 144(c) (2) provides that rule 144 will be available where the issuer
is not a reporting company if certain information about it is "publicly available."
Query what constitutes public availability? See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5306,
pt VI.B. (Sept. 26, 1972).
178 See American Standard, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
5 79,071 (SEC 1972).
170 Rule 144 (a) (2) "person" aggregation is expressly carried over to rule 145
via rule 145(e), which uses the rule 144(a)(2) definition of "person" for the purposes
of rules 145(c)-(d). As a result of rule 144(a)(2), family members A and B in
the reorganization hypothetical would have to aggregate their sales if they shared
the same home.
180 See Comtech Laboratories, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 5 79,231 (SEC 1973); Bank of Delaware, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L REP. " 79,162 (SEC 1972).
181 See Note, rupra note 152, at 941-42, 957; notes 105-06 supra and accompany-
ing text. In addition to creating practical difficulties, the rule 145 (c) approach raises
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securities an affiliate of the acquired corporation receives, because
of rule 145 (c) he cannot freely resell them to the public. The
SEC's application of the 2(3) exception, on the other hand, is an
informal administrative device, and the possibility does exist of
deeming acquired-corporation affiliates to be underwriters for some,
but not all, purposes.18 2  Moreover, it could be argued that although
cooperative acquired-corporation affiliates are deemed to be under-
writers temporarily during the negotiations, they are not necessarily
underwriters as to the securities they receive in the reorganization
unless there was a view to a "distribution" of these securities beyond
the affiliates.183  While such solutions would eliminate one of the
problems caused by deeming acquired-corporation affiliates under-
conceptual problems as well. The SEC's traditional approach for section 2(3) purposes
has been to use the "sells for . . . in connection with . . . distribution" branch
of the section 2(11) underwriter definition. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
Under this theory, the reorganization exchange itself can serve as the necessary "distri-
bution." But rule 145 (c), by focusing on the affiliates' resale of their own securities
instead of on their initial activities in promoting the reorganization, appears to be utiliz-
ing the "purchased from ... with a view to" branch. The distribution must therefore
be found in the resale. This means that when an acquired-corporation affiliate receives
only a small amount of acquiring-corporation securities in connection with a reorganiza-
tion, his resale of these securities to the public is nonetheless deemed to be a distribu-
tion, even though it looks like an ordinary trading transaction. This result is difficult
to reconcile with the SEC's position in Alco Standard Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 79,113 (SEC 1972). In Alco the Division of
Corporate Finance of the SEC stated it would not recommend any action where the
three shareholders and controlling persons of the acquired corporation, who did not
become affiliates of the acquiring corporation, resold the small amount of securities
they received in the B reorganization without registering them. The SEC apparently
believed that there was no distribution beyond the acquired-corporation affiliates. In
other words, when a B reorganization is involved, not all later sales to the public
will be deemed to be distributions. The distribution concept is discussed further
at note 110 supra.
182 See Schief & Sipple, The Corporate "Spin-Off" Device: Securities Act and
Exchange Act Considerations, 16 How. LJ. 719, 734 (1971). The SEC's interpretive
technique makes it possible to assume that cooperative affiliates, although underwriters
for the purpose of absolving the issuer from the gunjumping problem, are not under-
writers for the purpose of depriving them of the right to resell their securities without
need for registration or exemption. Since rule 145 is directed specifically at resale
limitations, it admits of no such contextual variation.
183 To adopt this approach the Commission must say that: (1) with respect to
securities received by other acquired-corporation shareholders, the affiliates are "selling
for" underwriters and become underwriters as soon as the negotiations begin, but
(2) with respect to the securities they themselves receive, the affiliates are to be treated
only as "purchase from" underwriters and do not become underwriters unless they
had a view to selling their securities in a transaction that constitutes a "distribution."
This approach could be justified on the theory that the originally presumed "selling
for" posture of the affiliate (with respect to both his own securities and the securities
sold to his fellow security holders) wanes as the reorganization period passes, leaving
the "purchase from" branch of section 2 (11) as the only method for establishing un-
derwriter status. This theory is at odds with the view of "distribution" underlying
rule 14 5 (c). See note 160 supra.
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writers, they require a rather complex construction of the under-
writer definition in the statute in order to make it match precisely
the interplay of conflicting administrative policies cutting for and
against underwriter status. As a result, the potential for arbitrari-
ness and uncertainty in determining when an affiliate is an under-
writer would be increased. And these approaches would do noth-
ing to solve the problems caused by the across-the-board sweep of
rule 145 (c).
In summary, although acquired corporation affiliates in A and
C reorganizations will now be deemed to be underwriters under rule
145 (c), this rule does not eliminate the need to resolve the prob-
lems created by presumptively calling them underwriters for pur-
poses of the section 2(3) exception. And it creates some new prob-
lems as well.
2. B Reorganizations
In a direct exchange between the acquiring corporation and the
acquired corporation's shareholders, but for the use of the section
2 (3) exception, the status of such a shareholder vis-i-vis the acquired
corporation is unimportant in determining whether he is an under-
writer.'84 To be an underwriter in a B reorganization, a recipient
of securities must either become an affiliate of the acquiring corpora-
tion or qualify under section 2(11). Therefore, the use of the sec-
tion 2(3) exception in a B reorganization subjects acquired-corpora-
tion affiliates to the disabilities attending underwriter status, while
absent the use of the exception they would not be underwriters and
would not be subject to those disabilities. Here, then, is the greatest
anomaly created by the SEC's approach to the problem of negotia-
tion gunjumping. It is dear that a better solution to this problem
is needed.
IV. SUMMARY AND PROPOSALS
Negotiations must precede corporate reorganizations. If they
take place prior to registration of the securities that will be distrib-
uted in the reorganization, they are likely to violate section 5(c)
of the Securities Act as involving "attempts to dispose" of acquiring-
corporation securities without registration. Excepting the negotia-
tions as offers under section 2(3) by terming the target corporation
184 See Schneider & Manko, supra note 5, at 997; Note, supra note 152, at
957. Cf. Alco Standard Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
9 79,113 (SEC 1972).
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affiliate negotiators "underwriters" is an imperfect solution to this
dilemma. Further, acquired-corporation affiliates need the protection
of section 5. An approach is needed that will reconcile the need
for buyer protection with the necessity for prereorganization nego-
tiations.
The basic problem lies in the effects of underwriter status. Un-
derwriters are subject to resale restrictions and potential section 11
liability, and, in addition they cannot enjoy the protection the securi-
ties acts give purchasers generally. It is highly questionable whether
imposing these disabilities upon acquired-corporation affiliates
through rule 145(c) or through the section 2(3) exception can be
justifieed solely because of affiliate status with the acquired corpora-
tion.
What is needed is an administrative policy or, preferably, a rule
exempting prereorganization negotiations and agreements from the
definition of "offer to sell" and "offer to buy" in section 5(c) with-
out deeming acquired-corporation affiliates underwriters. Similarly,
rule 145 (c) should be altered to take the emphasis off an individual's
status within the acquired corporation. 1 85
Excluding apparent attempts to dispose from the definition of
"offer" is not unprecedented. The SEC has done so in several in-
stances, two of which have already been noted. The first involves
the need to give "some adequate form of notice" of the fairness
hearing to all persons to whom securities will be issued pursuant
to section 3(a) (10) as a prerequisite to obtaining the exemp-
tion. 86 The second is inquiry by an issuer to verify its reasonable
grounds to believe that prospective private placees satisfy the re-
quirements of proposed rule 146(d).18 A third example is the sub-
mission for shareholder approval of a proposal to create new securi-
ties or to offer authorized but unissued securities in a recapitalization.
The solicitation of approval, even where the securities involved are
ultimately going to be offered to the same shareholders, has been
permitted prior to the filing of a registration statement.188
185,Note, supra note 152, at 957-61. At a minimum, rule 145(c) should be
rephrased so that the branch of section 2(11) consisting of the phrase "purchase
from with a view to distribution" would be part of the rule's definition and bring
about uniformity in treatment of negotiations for A, B, and C reorganizations.
18 6 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
187 See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
188 1 Loss 542-43. The rule here proposed would allow the section 2(11) defini-
tion of underwriter to be applied without strain. Underwriter status would no longer
be grafted onto acquired-corporation affiliates (1) who receive and resell small amounts
of acquiring-corporation securities but do not resell their securities or any other securi-
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The proposed approach to the problem of negotiation gunjump-
ing would solve the problems inherent in the present SEC approach.
It would eliminate the present uncertainty in identifying which ac-
quired-corporation negotiators qualify as underwriters. It would
also resolve the present conflict between the acquiring corporation's
desire that the negotiations not be subject to section 5 with the
goal of acquired-corporation negotiators to negotiate without the
burdens of underwriter status. Moreover, acquired-corporation affili-
ates would not be underwriters by reason of their affiliate status
alone. And since the exception to the definition of "offer" would
only be for purposes of section 5(c), there still would be a section
2(3) "offer" and "sale" upon which acquired-corporation affiliates
could base actions under the various antifraud provisions of the se-
curities acts.
Since the proposed rule would allow offers to be made during
the negotiations without the usual protective disclosure, it should
limit the number of persons who can represent the acquired corpora-
tion at the negotiations. Affiliate status with the acquired corpora-
tion could be required of all negotiators. Since being an affiliate
of the acquired corporation would not incur underwriter status, the
use of an affiliate test would not be as objectionable under the pro-
posed rule as it is under the current practice.18 9
Finally, the rule should provide for some form of required dis-
closure by the acquiring corporation. Since section 5(c) will be
circumvented, some other means should be devised to give "offerees"
in the negotiations the information they need. Perhaps the solution
is to require an abbreviated filing with the SEC prior to beginning
the negotiations, which could be given to the acquired-corporation
negotiators. 1 0
In summary, the problems caused by using the section 2(3) ex-
ception to permit prereorganization negotiations can be solved by
creating by rule a new exception to section 5 (c) which will permit
ties for the issuer, and (2) who receive large amounts of such securities with no
intention to resell and who do not sell other securities for the issuer.
189 To obviate problems in identifying affiliates of the acquired corporation, see
notes 108-19 supra and accompanying text, the rule could permit the acquiring corpora-
tion to negotiate with those persons in the acquired corporation with whom it has
reason to believe it must negotiate in order to properly finalize the terms of the
reorganization.
190 The filing could be similar to that required under rule 146. See notes 99-
104 supra and accompanying text. For example, unaudited financial statements might
be allowed. If the acquiring corporation is a reporting company, the use of its latest
reports should suffice.
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those negotiations. Such a rule would protect the acquiring corpo-
ration from the threat of gunjumping and at the same time ensure
that acquired-corporation negotiators receive the information they
need. It would not render persons underwriters solely on the basis
of their positions within the acquired corporation, but would allow
the section 2(11) definition of "underwriter" to operate in a normal
fashion.
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